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Natural Philosophy and the Use of Causal Terminology: A Puzzle in Reid’s Account 
of Natural Philosophy 
Abstract: 
Thomas Reid thinks of natural philosophy as a purely nomothetic enterprise but 
he maintains that it is proper for natural philosophers to employ causal terminology in 
formulating their explanatory claims.  In this paper, I analyze this puzzle in light of 
Reid’s distinction between efficient and physical causation—a distinction he grounds in 
his strict understanding of active powers.  I consider several possible reasons that Reid 
may have for maintaining that natural philosophers ought to employ causal terminology 
and suggest that the underlying rationale for his views is his understanding of the aims of 
explanation and their connection to the interests of human agents.  The ultimate aim of 
knowing the causes of phenomena is to mollify the natural intellectual curiosity of human 
inquirers and provide guidance that insures successful action.  The discovery of laws 
governing phenomena fulfills this aim and, as such, it is appropriate for natural 
philosophers to employ causal terminology.   
1. Introduction 
Thomas Reid explicitly rejects the traditional view that the aim of natural 
philosophy is to discover the causes of phenomena.  In its place, he proposes a 
Newtonian-inspired model in which the sole aim of natural philosophy is to discover the 
laws governing phenomena.  He writes,  
Former authors ancient and modern not excepting Francis Bacon, have 
conceived it to be the province of physics to discover the causes of the 
phenomena of nature…[but according] to Newton, when physics shall be 
carried to the utmost perfection, there would not be found in the whole 
science such a conception as that of a cause; nothing but laws of nature, 
which are general facts grounded on experience, and phenomena which 
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are particular facts, included in the more general, and consequent upon 
them.1 
 
But Reid also maintains that natural philosophy is a kind of causal inquiry.  He asserts, 
“The whole business of physics is to discover, by observation and experiment, the laws of 
nature, and to apply them to the solution of the phenomena: this we call discovering the 
causes of things.”2   
The consistency of these claims depends upon Reid’s contention that the term 
‘cause’ has an equivocal meaning.  Reid writes, “The word cause, is very ambiguous in 
all languages…The words power, agent, effect, have a like ambiguity; each different 
meaning of the first mentioned word leading to a corresponding meaning of the three 
last.”3  In order to clarify his use of these terms, Reid introduces a distinction between 
efficient and physical causality.4  The efficient cause of a natural phenomenon is the 
agent, endowed with both will and intellect, that produces the phenomenon by the 
exercise of its active powers.5  Within the domain of natural philosophy, the term 
‘physical cause’ refers primarily to laws governing natural phenomena.6  Thus, Reid 
maintains that natural philosophy is a form of causal inquiry only in the attenuated sense 
that it aims to discover the physical causes of phenomena. 
Although the distinction between efficient and physical causality shows that it is 
possible to describe natural philosophy as a form of causal inquiry, it does not give one 
positive reasons to think that causal terminology ought to be employed in natural 
philosophy.  This is puzzling given Reid’s explicit recognition that the use of causal 
terminology causes significant misunderstanding concerning the achievements of natural 
philosophy.  Reid writes,  
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the ambiguity of the words cause, agency, active power, and the other 
words related to these, has led many to understand them, when used in 
natural philosophy, in a wrong sense, and in a sense which is neither 
necessary for establishing the true principles of natural philosophy, nor 
ever meant by the most enlightened in that science. To be convinced of 
this, we may observe that those very philosophers who attribute to matter 
the power of gravitation, and other active powers, teach us, at the same 
time, that matter is a substance altogether inert, and merely passive; that 
gravitation, and the other attractive and repulsive powers which they 
ascribe to it, are not inherent in its nature, but impressed upon it by some 
external cause, which they do not pretend to know or to explain.7 
 
It is instructive, then, to consider whether Reid has positive reasons for maintaining that 
natural philosophers ought to employ causal terminology. 
Reid scholarship has not addressed this particular question adequately because 
commentators often approach the distinction between efficient and physical causation 
with an eye towards other pressing concerns in Reid’s work.  Some scholars interested in 
Reid’s conception of agency and its connection to debates about human freedom note the 
distinction between efficient and physical causation as a response to the apparently 
paradoxical implications of Reid’s views on agency.  For instance, Timothy O’Connor 
writes, 
[Reid] claims that the notion of an agent directly bringing about some 
event (a volition) is the original and primary sense of the term 
‘cause’...[and this] implies a thesis repugnant to common sense (and in 
that respect very uncharacteristic of Reid ), viz., that the patterns of 
regularity that we observe between events (apparently) not under the direct 
control of any intelligent agent are not, properly speaking, indicative of 
genuinely causal relations.  In order to avoid being understood as 
advancing a wildly implausible claim, he acknowledges at once “another 
meaning of the word cause, which is so well authorized by custom, that 
we cannot always avoid using it, and I think we may call it the physical 
sense”.8 
 
Accordingly, Reid could contend that one ought to employ causal terminology in natural 
philosophy because of the entrenched function of causal language in common discourse.  
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Any attempt to purge the vocabulary of causality from natural philosophy would violate 
the long-standing authority of customary usage and, hence, ought to be avoided. 
 Other scholars interested primarily in Reid’s understanding of the methods and 
aims of natural philosophy note the distinction between efficient and physical causes in 
order to highlight Reid’s novel interpretation of Newtonian natural philosophy. 9  Steffen 
Ducheyne argues that “Reid took it that Newtonian science restricted itself—and 
philosophical inquiry should do so as well—to provide a nomological-necessitarian 
explanation of phenomena.”10  By employing the term ‘physical cause’, Reid could 
illuminate his strict demarcation between natural philosophy and metaphysical 
speculation concerning the ultimate efficient causes of phenomena.11  And given the 
common association between causation and explanation, use of the term ‘physical cause’ 
could reinforce the common understanding of natural philosophy as an explanatory 
project while signaling Reid’s novel understanding of the nature of ultimate explanation 
in natural philosophy. 
 The central goals of this paper are (i) to explore these responses and (ii) to 
develop an account of Reid’s positive case for the continued use of causal terminology in 
natural philosophy.  I suggest that Reid draws a connection between the speculative and 
practical interests of human inquirers and the aim of explanation; it is this connection that 
provides the rationale for his claim that natural philosophers ought to employ causal 
terminology.  Much of this discussion will require a precise characterization of the 
distinction between efficient and physical causation—a distinction best understood in 
light of Reid’s account of active powers.  So, the structure of this paper is as follows.  In 
Section Two, I summarize Reid’s account of efficient causality and physical causality.  In 
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Section Three, I develop an interpretation of Reid’s positive philosophical case for the 
continued use of causal terminology in natural philosophy. 
2. Active Powers and Reid’s Distinction between Efficient and Physical Causation 
  Reid argues that powers are qualities or attributes of an agent that enable it to 
initiate activity and, thereby, to produce change.  His understanding of efficient causation 
is grounded in this primitive notion of a power.  He writes, 
The exertion of active power we call action; and, as every action produces 
some change, so every change must be caused by some exertion, or by the 
cessation of some exertion of power.  That which produces a change by 
the exertion of its power we call the cause of that change; and the change 
produced, the effect of that cause.12 
 
It is important to note that Reid distinguishes between a power, the exercise or operation 
of a power, and the effect resulting from the exercise of a power.  Only those endowed 
with a power can exercise it to bring about an effect.   
But the exertion of a power depends upon the will of the agent to which the power 
belongs.  Reid contends that the  
only clear notion or idea we have of active power, is taken from the power 
which we find in ourselves to give certain motions to our bodies, or a 
certain direction to our thoughts; and this power in ourselves can be 
brought into action only by willing or volition.  From this, I think, it 
follows, that, if we had not will, and that degree of understanding which 
will necessarily implies, we could exert no active power, and, 
consequently, could have none; for power that cannot be exerted is no 
power.  It follows, also, that the active power, of which only we can have 
any distinct conception, can be only in beings that have understanding and 
will.  Power to produce any effect, implies power not to produce it.13 
 
Hence, Reid maintains that insofar as an agent with a power to produce an effect chooses 
not to exert its power, then the effect will not occur.  While effects are essentially 
connected to their causes, the will of an agent is under no direct necessitation to exert 
itself; there is genuine indeterminacy in the production of an effect. 
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The idea of power originates in an agent’s reflection on the production of an event 
through the exertion of its will.  It emerges very early in the cognitive life of a child as it 
learns that it can produce desirable states of affairs by an exercise of its will.  From this, 
the child learns that these events depend upon the exertions of its powers and, thereby, 
acquires the idea of a power to produce an event.  Reid writes, 
I am rather inclined to think that our first exertions are instinctive, without 
any distinct conception of the event that is to follow, consequently without 
will to produce that event.  And that finding by experience that such 
exertions are followed by such events, we learn to make the exertion 
voluntarily and deliberately, as often as we desire to produce the event.  
And when we know or believe that the event depends upon our exertion, 
we have the conception of power in ourselves to produce that event.  This 
account of the origin of our conception of power, makes it to be the fruit 
of experience and not innate; though it must be as early as any deliberate 
voluntary exertion to produce a certain event.14 
 
While it may be unproblematic to attribute causal powers to oneself given the 
awareness of one’s own exertions, Reid recognizes that it is important to consider 
whether one can attribute efficient causality to physical entities.  Furthermore, he 
understands the difficulties associated with determining whether physical entities can 
possess active powers.  He writes,  
The ambiguity of the words power, cause, agent, and of all the words 
related to these, tends to perplex this question.  The weakness of human 
understanding, which gives us only an indirect and relative conception of 
power, contributes to darken our reasoning, and should make us cautious 
and modest in our determinations.15 
   
In spite of these difficulties, Reid argues that there is no clear observational evidence 
grounding the attribution of active powers to physical entities.  He asserts, “We perceive 
changes innumerable in things without us.  We know that these changes must be 
produced by the active power of some agent; but we neither perceive the agent nor the 
power, but the change only.”16   
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And if one attends to human agency, it is evident that volition is essential to the 
actualization of a human agent’s active powers.  It follows from this, according to Reid, 
that “if we had not will, and that degree of understanding which will necessarily implies, 
we could exert no active power, and consequently could have none: For power that 
cannot be exerted is no power.”17  Hence, the clearest notion of active powers indicates 
that active powers can be predicated only of those entities with both intellect and will.  
One cannot attribute natural phenomena to the productive powers of physical entities as 
such since there is no evidence that they possess either intellect or will.  Reid asserts, 
We judge of things unknown by what we know, and as we first know by 
consciousness that we think and act and feel pain and pleasure, we are by analogy 
rather than by reasoning led to think the same of other men; and indeed not only 
of other men but of other things.  It is a discovery made by degrees, and by 
observation and instruction, that many of the things about us, are so very unlike to 
us as to be perfectly inanimate and unthinking.18 
 
Nonetheless, Reid concedes that it is common practice to use terms implying that 
physical entities possess active powers.  Reid traces this practice to the development of 
language at early stages in human history.  The distinction between active and passive 
verbs emerged from the recognition of an essential difference between acting and being 
acted upon.  But humans quickly began to apply active terms to entities which subsequent 
inquiry has shown to be purely passive.  Ultimately, these primitive people misapplied 
active terms to passive entities because of the basic human desire to know the causes of 
various changes in the external world.  Reid writes,  
As there is no principle that appears to be more universally acknowledged 
by mankind, from the first dawn of reason, than that every change we 
observe in nature must have a cause; so this is no sooner perceived, than 
there arises in the human mind a strong desire to know the causes of those 
changes that fall without our observation.  Felix qui potuit rerum 
cognoscere causas, is the voice of nature in all men.  Nor is there anything 
that more early distinguishes the rational from the brute creation, than this 
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avidity to know the causes of things, of which I see no sign in brute-
animals.”19 
 
When primitive people observed changes in physical bodies without detecting the agency 
responsible for these changes, they attributed the activity to the physical bodies 
themselves.  Reid concludes,   
it is a general prejudice of our early years, and of rude nations, when we 
perceive anything to be changed, and do not perceive any other thing 
which we can believe to be the cause of that change, to impute it to the 
thing itself, and conceive it to be active and animated, so far as to have the 
power of producing that change in itself.20 
 
This prejudice is most likely rooted in the human tendency to make judgments 
concerning other entities by reference to human activities and qualities.   
The human desire to know the causes of things did not affect primitive people 
alone.  It also led philosophers to propose speculative conjectures concerning the 
underlying mechanisms and processes responsible for producing observable phenomena.  
Reid, in a sustained critique of these views, suggests that the limits of human 
understanding make it necessary to confess ignorance rather than to propose or endorse 
hypothetical speculation of this kind.21  Natural philosophers who frame these hypotheses 
are, in reality, revealing their ignorance rather than providing an illuminating 
understanding of physical phenomena.  Reid asserts, 
Nature is the name we give to the efficient cause of innumerable effects 
which fall daily under our observation.  But if it be asked what nature?  
Whether the first universal cause, or a subordinate one, whether one or 
many, whether intelligent or unintelligent?  Upon these points we find 
various conjectures and theories, but no solid ground upon which we can 
rest.  And I apprehend the wisest men are they who are sensible that they 
know nothing of the matter.22 
 
At most, experience indicates that there is some intelligent first cause but whether this 
cause acts immediately to bring about all natural phenomena or acts indirectly by 
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endowing physical entities with powers to bring about these effects is beyond the limits 
of human understanding.23  So, all hypothetical conjectures are in reality veiled claims of 
ignorance concerning the underlying productive causes of phenomena; as such, they are 
unwarranted in natural philosophy. 
Reid’s analysis of the strict notion of efficient causation entails that no physical 
entity possesses genuine causal powers.  But Reid allows a loose sense of the term 
‘cause’ that has its proper place in natural philosophy.  In fact, he asserts that the goal of 
natural philosophy is the discovery of physical causes.  His most explicit description of 
the distinction between efficient causality and physical causality occurs in his 
correspondence with Lord Kames and Dr. James Gregory.  Consider some representative 
passages: 
[A] It is proper here to explain what is meant by the cause of a 
phenomenon, when that word is used in natural philosophy.  The word 
cause is so ambiguous, that I fear many mistake its meaning, and take it to 
mean the efficient cause, which I think it never does in this science.  By 
the cause of a phenomenon, nothing is meant but the law of nature, of 
which that phenomenon is an instance, or a necessary consequence…In 
natural philosophy, therefore, we seek only the general laws, according to 
which nature works, and these we call the causes of what is done 
according to them.  But such laws cannot be the efficient cause of 
anything.  They are only the rule according to which the efficient cause 
operates.  A natural philosopher may search after the cause of a law of 
nature; but this means no more than searching for a more general law, 
which includes that particular law, and perhaps many others under it.24 
 
[B] I likewise admit, laws of nature may be called (as they commonly are 
called) physical causes—in a sense indeed somewhat different from 
[efficient causes]—because laws of nature effect nothing, but as far as 
they are put to execution, either by some agent, or by some physical cause; 
they being, however, our ne plus ultra in natural philosophy, which 
professes to shew us the causes of natural things, and being, both in 
ancient and modern times, called causes, they have by prescription 
acquired a right to that name.  I think also, and I believe you agree with 
me, that every physical cause must be the work of some agent or efficient 
cause.  Thus, that a body put in motion continues to move till it be 
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stopped, is an effect which, for what I know, may be owing to an inherent 
property in matter; if this be so, this property of matter is the physical 
cause of the continuance of the motion; but the ultimate efficient cause is 
the Being who gave this property to matter.25 
 
[C] …in theology and in metaphysicks, the most common sense [of the 
term cause] is that of agent or efficient cause…In physicks, and in all its 
branches, medicine, chymistry, agriculture, the mechanical arts, &c…the 
most common meaning of cause is Hume’s notion of it—to wit, something 
which goes before the effect, and is conjoyned with it in the course of 
nature.  As this notion is vague and popular, philosophers, when they 
would speak more precisely of a cause in physicks, mean by it some law 
of nature, of which the phenomenon called the effect is a necessary 
consequence.26 
 
 In these passages, there are several distinct uses of the term ‘physical cause’.  In 
[A], Reid suggests that laws of nature governing particular phenomena or more general 
laws under which one can subsume particular laws are the proper meaning of ‘physical 
cause’ in natural philosophy.  In [B], Reid again claims that laws of nature are physical 
causes of phenomena, but he also suggests that one could describe an inherent property of 
matter as a physical cause.  Reid claims, however, that the ultimate efficient cause of the 
effect attributed to this property as a physical cause is the ultimate intelligent agent—
God.  In [C], Reid asserts that the most common meaning of ‘physical cause’ is the 
Humean notion of an antecedent of an empirical regularity.  Physical causes, unlike 
efficient causes, are not genuinely active; they are incapable of initiating activity that 
results in the production of an effect. 
 
3. Reid’s Positive Account of the Use of Causal Terminology in Natural Philosophy  
Given Reid’s strict understanding of efficient causality, there is no question 
concerning the use of the term ‘cause’ in natural philosophy.  Causation in natural 
philosophy is physical causation.  Since natural philosophers can distinguish clearly 
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between physical and efficient causality, one can think of natural philosophy as a form of 
causal inquiry.  But this does not necessarily give one positive reason to think natural 
philosophers should employ causal terminology.  Reid thinks that natural philosophers 
ought to employ causal terms while precisely characterizing its meaning so as to avoid 
the potentially misleading implications of causal terms.  In the introduction, I noted that 
some scholars attempt to resolve this puzzle by citing Reid’s account of the entrenched 
structure of language.  Altering the language of common discourse would require making 
changes that would be difficult to achieve and would violate common sense.  Others 
suggest that Reid’s defense depends upon the common association between explanation 
and causation.  By employing the terminology of physical causation, natural philosophers 
can secure the common view that natural philosophy is explanatory form of inquiry while 
contrasting ultimate explanation in natural philosophy with the kinds of explanation 
proper to metaphysics.    In what follows, I consider these views in greater detail and 
suggest that Reid draws a connection between the aims of explanation the speculative and 
practical interests of human inquirers.  It is this connection that grounds Reid’s positive 
case for the continued use of causal terminology in natural philosophy. 
Consider, first, the argument that the continued use of causal terminology in 
natural philosophy is proper given its entrenched status in the structure of language.  
Reid’s etiological account of the misapplication of causal terms to physical entities holds 
that causal terminology has become an entrenched feature of language concerning 
physical entities.  The human avidity to know the causes of phenomena coupled with the 
inability to detect the agents responsible for physical changes leads inevitably to the 
misapplication of causal terms to essentially passive physical entities.  Although this 
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established use is improper, a change to the structure of language is not feasible.  It is 
much easier to continue using the term ‘cause’ and carefully correct any false 
implications resulting from employing this term when referring to physical entities.  But 
there are two ways in which one can understand this authority of customary usage that 
ought to be considered independently.  First, one might argue that the entrenched 
structure of human language makes the use of causal terminology unavoidable.  Second, 
although it may possible to avoid employing causal terminology in natural philosophy, 
one could contend that the customary usage of causal terminology makes its use natural.  
Hence, one ought to employ causal terminology because failing to employ it is a violation 
of common sense. 
While the misleading use of causal terms by common persons may be 
unavoidable, it is not entirely clear why this would apply mutatis mutandis to the use of 
causal terminology in natural philosophy.  Reid admits that the common person’s idea of 
a cause retains within it remnants of the original idea of a productive efficacy.  He writes, 
“The vulgar, in their notion even of the physical cause of a phænomenon, include some 
conception of efficiency or productive influence.”27  But the distinct understanding of 
physical causes as laws of nature in natural philosophy does not carry any connotation of 
causal efficacy.  Reid writes 
But Newton…has taught us to acquiesce in a law of nature, according to 
which the effect is produced, as the utmost that natural philosophy can 
reach, leaving what can be known of the agent or efficient cause to 
metaphysicks or natural theology.  This I look upon as one of the great 
discoveries of Newton; for I know of none that went before him in it.  It 
has new-modelled our notion of physical causes, but, at the same time, 
carried it farther from what I take to the original notion of cause or agent.28 
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Given that the notion of a physical cause in natural philosophy is even further removed 
from the original notion of a cause, it is unclear why one would think that causal 
terminology is unavoidable in natural philosophy.  In fact, Reid’s discussion of physical 
causes as laws suggests a mode for reducing causal vocabulary to statements about laws 
governing phenomena.  In the context of natural philosophy, then, causal terminology is 
avoidable. 
 But this argument does not undercut the view that customary usage of causal 
terminology has made its use natural in the context of natural philosophy.  Reid could 
argue the excision of causal language from natural philosophy does violence to the 
naturalness of employing this terminology.  The long use of causal vocabulary, especially 
in relation to physical bodies, has made it natural, and hence an aspect of the common 
sense understanding of the physical realm, to think physical entities as causes.  Although 
natural philosophers maintain that physical entities are essentially passive, it would be 
imprudent to frame their explanatory claims in a manner that violated the natural 
authority of the common belief that physical entities act as the causes of phenomena.   
The naturalness of the use of causal terminology extends to the common 
association between causation and explanation.  Hagit Benbaji characterizes this point as 
follows: “Reid knows that most of us are not scientists.  But for him science answers 
exactly the same question that we address in our everyday explanations: what 
happened?”29  Typically, the common person is satisfied to answer this question by 
claiming that physical bodies possess powers to produce the phenomenon in question.  
Although the common person may be satisfied with this explanation, there is a complete 
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story about the occurrence of phenomena that scientists seek to tell.  The goal, however, 
is the same: to explain phenomena.   
But natural philosophers explain phenomena by framing precise laws of 
phenomena grounded on substantive inductive evidence in the attempt to subsume 
phenomena under the scope of the law.  Knowledge of these laws enables one to make 
highly successful predictions concerning the regularities in nature and the future 
occurrences of phenomena.  This kind of inquiry aims to answer question of the form: 
“why did x occur?”  Understanding the laws of nature allows one to answer this kind of 
question thus: x occurred because x is a necessary consequence of an inductively-
established law.  This knowledge allows one to make predictions concerning when x 
would occur in the future and it allows one to “solve” phenomena in terms of their 
governing laws.  Thus, employing the language of physical causality is valuable because 
it signals a novel understanding of the nature of ultimate explanation of phenomena in 
natural philosophy.  Given the traditional understanding of the explanatory aim of natural 
philosophy, using causal terminology while explicitly acknowledging that it refers to 
laws alone allows one to maintain the connection between the achievements of natural 
philosophy and the notion of explanation.  
 I would like to suggest, however, that Reid’s positive case for the continued use 
of causal terminology in natural philosophy is rooted in something much more 
fundamental than the effects of customary usage on (i) the naturalness of its continued 
employment and (ii) the association between causation and explanation.  Although it is 
natural to employ causal terminology when referencing physical entities and there is a 
strong association in people’s minds between explaining phenomena and knowing their 
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causes, there is a deeper rationale underlying Reid’s claims that one ought to employ 
causal terminology.  Reid argues that the goal of explanation in natural philosophy and 
common life is the satisfaction of the intellectual and practical aims of human inquirers.  
Human concern with the causes of phenomena derives from two sources: intellectual 
curiosity and practical need.  Hence, he observes,  
With regard to the phænomena of nature, the important end of knowing 
their causes, besides gratifying our curiousity, is, that we may know when 
to expect them, or how to bring them about.  This is very often of real 
importance in life; and this purpose is served by knowing what, by the 
course of nature, goes before them and is connected with them; and this, 
therefore, we call the cause of such a phænomenon.30   
 
In Reid’s estimation, the value of knowing the causes of phenomena stems from how 
human agents can employ this information in the prediction and control of events.  The 
explanatory claims substantiated by the methods of natural philosophy provide a kind of 
knowledge that is beneficial to the agent both in terms of the satisfaction of its natural 
curiosity and in terms of its actions.31   
The common person, then, employs the term ‘cause’ to refer to the antecedent of 
an established empirical regularity and uses this understanding to plan and execute his 
actions.  The natural philosopher employs the term ‘cause’ to refer to a law of nature and 
uses this understanding to provide an account of various phenomena and to ground 
predictions concerning future occurrences of phenomena.  The precise understanding of 
the relations between phenomena serves to mollify the natural intellectual curiosity of 
human nature.  Knowledge of the precise laws governing phenomena is a reliable guide 
in directing one’s actions.   It grounds an understanding of phenomena that allows for 
careful planning and execution of one’s actions.  This knowledge insures that the agent 
can reliably achieve its goals by the exercise of its active powers.  So, Reid’s positive 
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case for the use of causal terminology in natural philosophy is grounded in the aims and 
interests of human inquirers who can use the knowledge of physical causes to their 
benefit in their actions as agents.  The rationale for knowing the causes of phenomena 
stems from the real speculative and practical interests of human inquirers.  Since natural 
philosophy satisfies the intellectual curiosity and practical needs of human agents, it 
satisfies the ultimate aim of explanation.  Hence, natural philosophy is properly 
considered a kind of causal inquiry and, as such, natural philosophers ought to employ 
causal terminology in the formulation of their explanatory claims. 
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